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Chapter Two

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An SD Agent of Rare Importance (U)

If Operation SUNRISE represents the role that OSS played to bring about the conclusion of the war by strategic means (the high-level discussions between senior German and Allied officials), then the use of low-level agents to counter enemy intelligence activities took more of a tactical character. This responsibility fell to OSS's X-2, or counterespionage branch.¹ X-2 collected information on Axis intelligence organizations and espionage activities while protecting OSS from penetration. Following its establishment in 1943, X-2 also maintained security of OSS's own operations, "vetted" or conducted background checks on OSS employees and agents, and acted in a liaison capacity with other American counterintelligence agencies and with foreign intelligence services. (U)

In northwestern Europe, X-2 units, known as Special Counter Intelligence (SCI) detachments, operated with the American forces in the field, including the Twelfth Army

¹For a general study of X-2, see Timothy J. Naftali, *X-2 and the Apprenticeship of American Counterespionage, 1942-44* (Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University, 1993). Naftali has also written an article discussing X-2's operations in postwar Germany. See Naftali, "Im Zerrspiegel: US Gegenspionage in Deutschland, 1945-1948," in Wolfgang Krieger and Jurgen Weber, eds., *Spionage für den Frieden: Nachrichtendienste in Deutschland während des Kalten Krieges* (Munich: Olzog Verlag, 1997). (U)

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Group and its subordinate armies, the First, Third, and Ninth. X-2 also had similar units serving with the Sixth Army Group and its Seventh Army, and liaison with the First French Army. Other SCI detachments supported the Communications Zone of the European Theater of Operations in France and the British Twenty-first Army Group.² They fell under the counterintelligence branch of the G-2, or intelligence, section of the various headquarters to which they were assigned. The strength of the SCI units ranged from 15 officers and enlisted men at the Army Group level to 10 operating at the Army level. Like most OSS organizations in the field and at home, the SCI detachments included both male and female members, including civilians, as well as a handful of officers and enlisted men who came from the US Navy and Marine Corps. The bulk of the military personnel, however, hailed from the Army. All told, X-2 had some 200 officers, enlisted men, and civilian personnel in Germany in mid-1945 under the overall direction of Lt. Col. Andrew H. Berding.³ (U)

²The 31st SCI Detachment, with the First Army, landed in France in June 1944 and was followed by the Third Army's 62d SCI Detachment the following month. Both units formed the Twelfth Army's Group SCI Detachment in August 1944, and it split following the liberation of Paris. Approximately half of the personnel remained in the French capital as the headquarters for X-2 in France. In the meantime, the 69th SCI Detachment came up with the Seventh Army in southern France in August 1944. The detachment later split into three separate SCI units: the 11th, 55th, and 88th, the later serving with the Seventh Army at the front and the two other detachments in the rear areas. X-2/Paris also ran its own CI operations in addition to providing command and control for the SCI detachments in the field. The 103rd SCI Detachment handled X-2 liaison with the British in the Twenty-First Army Group's area of operations. *OSS War Report*, Vol. II, pp. 249-250. (U)

³Berding, born in 1902, graduated from Oxford University and worked as a journalist and editor before the war. Among his foreign posts, Berding had been AP's bureau chief in Rome during the 1930s. After the war, Berding held senior positions in the US Government, including deputy director of the US Information Agency and Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs. He was the author of several books and coauthor of *The Memoirs of Cordell Hull*. Berding died in August 1989. *Who's Who in America with World Notables: A Biographical Dictionary of*

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X-2 became involved in some of the most interesting operations during World War II, some of which formed the foundation for the earliest American intelligence operations in the Cold War. As outlined in a February 1944 directive from Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF), an SCI detachment in the field had the following missions:

1. To distribute and interpret to the CI Staffs all counterespionage information received by them from London and from other SCI units, and advise as to its most effective and secure use.
2. To afford the maximum protection to special sources of secret counterespionage information.
3. To advise CI Staffs in the selection of counterespionage targets whose capture is likely to yield materials of value.
4. To assist CI staffs in the examination of captured enemy documents or material of special counterespionage interest.
5. To assist CI Staffs in the interrogation of captured enemy agents.
6. To pass to London all information on enemy secret intelligence services collected in the field, including such captured documents and other materials as are no longer required in the field.
7. To serve as a direct channel between each Army Group headquarters for information on enemy secret intelligence services collected in the field.
8. To serve as a channel between the Army Groups and from the Army Groups to London for any other counterintelligence information that cannot be passed through normal service channels. (U)

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The British intelligence services, primarily MI 5 and Section V of MI 6, provided X-2 with extensive training and background on the German intelligence services. In particular, the British used X-2 as the channel to provide OSS with intelligence derived from German radio traffic—the famous ULTRA intercepts. Likewise, the British indoctrinated the Americans in the shadowy world of counterintelligence, especially double-agent operations. The British, by this time, had eliminated or doubled all of the German agents in the United Kingdom. The British and X-2 set up a CI War Room in the spring of 1944 to compile and distribute information about the German intelligence personnel, agents and operations. OSS's London Office controlled all X-2 operations although the Americans also set up a subordinate headquarters in Paris in the fall of 1944 to handle counterintelligence activities on the Continent. While the close American and British cooperation experienced some strains as the Allies moved across Western Europe, X-2's liaison with the British services proved essential to its wartime success and to the future of American CI activities in the postwar years.⁴ (U)

Almost immediately after the Normandy landings, X-2 found itself in the business of tracking down agents left by the Germans behind Allied lines. As X-2 uncovered these individuals scattered throughout France, it developed some of them as "controlled enemy agent" operations. By early 1945, X-2 had recruited a number of these agents—some Germans and many French and other native collaborators—for its penetration operations. The growing number of such recruitments prompted Brig. Gen. Eugene L.

⁴ See Timothy J. Naftali, "De Gaulle's Pique and the Allied Counterespionage Triangle in World War II," in Hayden B. Peake and Samuel Halpern, eds., *In the Name of Intelligence: Essays in Honor of Walter Pforzheimer* (Washington, DC: NIBC Press, 1994), pp. 379-410. (U)

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Harrison, G-2 of the Sixth Army Group, to provide guidance to his subordinate CI staffs at Army Group headquarters as well as the Seventh Army and the French First Army. In February 1945, Harrison called for a recruited enemy penetration agent to meet the following criteria:

1. He should previously have had some close and trusted contact with the German Intelligence Services (GIS), preferably the *Sicherheitsdienst* or *Abwehr*.
2. His contact should have been on a fairly high level. Local informants would not come within this category, although clerical employees who handled records would.
3. He should have been close to some German intelligence official for whom he could ask and to whom he would be instantly recognizable and recommendable.
4. He should be intelligent enough to realize that Germany has lost the war, and that his only chance to avoid the penalties for his previous association with the GIS is to help eliminate [the] GIS.
5. We should have very definite holds over him. He should owe to us his release from jail and temporary suspension of whatever sentence has been passed against him. His family should be on our side of the lines, and it should be established that there has been no estrangement from his family. His finances, if any, should be under Allied control or surveillance.
6. He should have had as genuine a change of political heart as possible. Undertaking a penetration mission merely to affect a release from jail is not sufficient motive.
7. He may be promised financial recompense; however, the recruiter must not let the prospective agent believe that the recruiter considers this any motive for the mission. The recruiter must convince the agent that he, the recruiter, believes the agent is undertaking the mission for patriotic motives, and the monetary angle is merely a side-issue designed to pay expenses or to maintain the agent's family.

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8. It is also believed that the penetration cases using persons who did not work for the German Intelligence Services similarly fall within such category because of the design that such persons, used as agents by us, shall become double agents through being used by the enemy.⁵ (U)

A Convinced Nazi (U)

The recruitment of enemy personnel as penetration agents presented both opportunities and risks for American intelligence. Brig. Gen. Harrison had appointed himself the sole approving authority in the Sixth Army Group for double agents. To act as his executive, Harrison designated Lt. Cdr. Akeley P. Quirk, the Sixth Army Group's SCI Detachment commander and a naval officer, as the coordinator of Enemy Penetration Cases. Requests by subordinate commands, including the French, to use enemy personnel as agents were routed through Lt. Cdr. Quirk who, in turn, submitted the names of the prospective agents to the War Room in London.⁶ (U)

When considering the use of enemy personnel, Harrison warned, "every effort will be made to prevent the agent from having access to [Allied] military information or observation." Likewise, case officers would not use any Allied military information as "feed" material until it had been coordinated by Lt. Cdr. Quirk and cleared, "word for word," by the G-2 and G-3 staffs at Army Group headquarters. Following the return of

⁵Brig. Gen. Eugene L. Harrison, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Sixth Army Group, to ACS, G-2, CI, Sixth Army Group, Seventh Army, and Commandant de Deuxieme Bureau, First French Army, "Penetration Agent Program," 19 February 1945, in Record Group 226, Records of the Office of Strategic Services, PARIS-X-2-OP-9, Entry 190B, Box 22, Folder 183, at National Archives and Records Administration (hereafter cited as RG 226, OSS Records, OSS File Number, Entry, Box, and Folder, NARA). (U)

⁶Ibid. (U)

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the agent to Allied control, the Sixth Army Group G-2 advised a full interrogation by the case officer to determine the reliability of the agent and his future usefulness. Case officers, in turn, would provide a full report of the operation to the G-2.⁷ (U)

As early as Christmas 1944, in the midst of the German offensive in the Ardennes, Lt. Cdr. Quirk expressed his concerns to Col. Harrison about how prospective agents were being handled in the Seventh Army. Quirk protested the Seventh Army's Counter Intelligence Corps handling of Ludwig Nebel, a newly captured prisoner. Quirk's inquiry highlighted the difficulties of using Germans as penetration agents and foreshadowed the risks that American intelligence took in using these individuals.⁸ (U)

On 2 November 1944, G-2, Seventh Army cabled the G-2, Sixth Army Group to report that two German saboteurs had been captured after crossing into American lines. The brief message stated that the two men planned to destroy gasoline pipelines and then travel to Paris to meet at the house of another saboteur. Identified as Ludwig Nebel, a Swiss-born member of the Waffen SS and an *Untersturmfuhrer* in the SD, and Maurice Zeller, a French civilian, the two men were captured prior to executing their mission. A third accomplice, Ferdinand Vliegen, had escaped capture and was being sought by American and French officials.⁹ (S)

The next day, Lt. Arthur Iselin, Jr., a member of the Seventh Army's SCI Detachment, provided X-2, Paris with a copy of Nebel's interrogation report by the 307th

⁷Ibid. (U)

⁸Lt. Cdr. Akeley P. Quirk to Col. Harrison, "CIB Coordination, Seventh Army," 22 December 1944, in RG 226, OSS Records, PARIS-X-2-OP-9, Entry 190B, Box 22, Folder 183, NARA. (U)

⁹Cable, G-2, Seventh Army to G-2, Sixth Army Group, 2 November 1944, SHAEF X-145/1, SMC IN 409, (S), in Ludwig Nebel, [redacted], DO Records. (S)

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CIC Detachment at Seventh Army headquarters. Following Nebel's capture by the 36th Infantry Division near Le Tholy, the German agent presented himself as an Alsatian who sought to join the French army. After the 36th CIC Detachment could not crack his story, the Americans turned him over to agents of the French Securite Militaire. According to an official CIC history, the French "gave him a thorough going over physically," and he was "unmercifully clubbed." Still he refused to confess until George Perper, a special agent with the Seventh Army's 307th CIC Detachment, produced a photo, that Perper claimed showed Nebel at Gestapo Headquarters in Paris. At this point, Nebel broke down and revealed that he was a SS NCO assigned to the sabotage section of RSHA Amt VI.¹⁰ (S)

Thirty-two years old at the time of his capture, Nebel was described as a "convinced Nazi" who "would have been glad to carry out his sabotage mission in France." A deserter from the Swiss army, Nebel had joined the Waffen SS in 1942.¹¹ He stated that he had received his orders directly from Walter Schellenberg, the head of Amt

¹⁰Lt. Arthur Iselin, Jr., Seventh Army SCI Detachment, to Robert Blum, X-2/Paris, "Preliminary Interrogation Report on Nebel, Ludwig, alias Neumann, Leon (nom de guerre) alias Haas, Karl," 3 November 1944, (S), enclosing Capt. M.E. Porter and Special Agent George A. Perper, 307th CIC Detachment, to Officer in Charge, "Nebel, Ludwig, alias Neumann, Leon (nom de guerre) alias Haas, Karl, confessed German Agent and Saboteur," 3 November 1944, (S), in Nebel, [redacted], DO Records. Porter and Perper wrote a follow-up report on Nebel's contacts in France on 14 November 1944. This CIC report and a 2 November 1944 translation of Nebel's "Confession" are located in his 201 file. See also US Army Intelligence Center, *History of the Counter Intelligence Corps*, Vol. XVII, *To the German Frontier Part II: Southern Armies 15 September-15 December 1944* (Baltimore: US Army Intelligence Center, 1959), pp. 12-15 (hereafter cited as *CIC History*, volume and page numbers). Citations are taken from the classified version of the *CIC History*, although the history has been declassified and is available at the National Archives and Records Administration and at the US Army Intelligence and Security Command, Ft. Belvoir, Va. (U)

¹¹Ibid. (U)

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VI, on 1 October 1944. Nebel received a million French francs, food, explosives, and an identity card in the name of an Alsatian who had been killed in an air raid.¹² Dispatched across the lines through a quiet sector, Nebel planned to join the French army or gain some other employment in order to get an identity card. He would then move into the interior of France to join other agents to locate Allied lines of communication and supply networks. (S)

Even before Seventh Army had an opportunity to finish its interrogation of Nebel, X-2 ordered that the German agent and his French accomplice be transferred to Paris for further questioning. X-2 promised to return both men after three days for disposition by CIC (both men faced trial and possible execution as spies).¹³ Upon arriving at the interrogation center in Paris, Maj. Franklin P. Holcomb, Jr., the chief of X-2/Paris, quickly observed that "Nebel in particular is an SD agent of rare importance, fully trained in sabotage, well acquainted with both officials and operations of the SD, and also briefed to contact a large staybehind network in France." Maj. Holcomb obtained verbal permission from the chief of the Counter Intelligence Branch, G-2 at SHAEF to "exploit

¹²Interestingly, the Germans had also given British pounds to Nebel, which proved to be counterfeit. According to a British report in January 1945, "this incident is an interesting one if we assume that Amt VI S drew these notes from Germany and gave them to an agent for him to live on, this will be the first occasion that we know of where the Germans have deliberately paid an agent of their's with forged notes." While the British had encountered counterfeit money in the possession of German agents in Portugal, the British believed that the agents had obtained this false money on the black market. British intelligence felt that paying an agent in fake money was "almost incredibly stupid," and if "this is a new feature in the technique of the German Secret Service, it may be worth having on record." E.W. Reid to Teresa Clay, 11 January 1945, [no classification listed] in Nebel, [] DO Records. (U)

¹³Cable, X-2/Paris to X-2, Seventh Army, 3 November 1944, Nr. 187, (no classification listed), in Nebel, [] DO Records. According to Lord Rothschild, Lt. Gen. Alexander McC. Patch, commander of the Seventh Army, wanted Nebel back from Paris within three days to execute him. (S)

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the capture of Nebel and Zeller by utilizing them to identify and thus help destroy the entire SD network." Holcomb promised to keep the Seventh Army G-2 posted of developments in the case.¹⁴ (S)

In Paris, Nebel underwent joint interrogations by both X-2 and MI 5 on his espionage background and sabotage mission. Lord Victor Rothschild of British intelligence examined Nebel's knowledge of German sabotage and quickly extracted what he needed from him.¹⁵ Rothschild then advocated that Nebel be sent to London for a more detailed interrogation at Camp 020, a special MI 5 facility for enemy prisoners in Great Britain. Instead, the French, who had been allowed to read the Nebel interrogation material, wanted to retain him in order to identify other members of the German staybehind network near Paris. The arrest of the third member of Nebel's team also added to the need for further interrogation of the three men in France.¹⁶ (S)

¹⁴Maj. Franklin P. Holcomb, Jr., X-2/Paris to G-2, Seventh Army, "Custody of Nebel, Ludwig and Zeller, Maurice by SCI-Paris," 10 November 1944, (S), in Nebel, [redacted], DO Records. Holcomb, born in 1917 in Washington, DC, was the son of Gen. Thomas Holcomb, the commandant of the US Marine Corps. After attending Georgetown University, Holcomb entered the Marine Corps in 1941 and served with OSS in Morocco, Algeria, the United Kingdom, France, and China before leaving the service as a major in 1946. Holcomb later worked with the Department of Commerce [redacted]

¹⁵Born in 1910, Lord Nathaniel Mayer Victor Rothschild was educated at Harrow and received his M.A. and Ph.D. from Trinity College, Cambridge. After his wartime service, Lord Rothschild was assistant director of research in the Department of Zoology in Cambridge and a specialist on fertilization. He held numerous appointments until his death in 1990. See Rothschild entry in C.S. Nicholls, ed. *The Dictionary of National Biography 1986-1990* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), pp. 384-385. (U)

¹⁶B.1.C to War Room, through Mr. Noble, 16 November 1944, enclosing "Ludwig Nebel (Saboteur) Tactical Interrogation," 11 November 1944, (S); IID Cross-Reference Form, "SCI Weekly Operations Report (Wed. 8 Nov. thru Wed. 15 November)," 21 November 1944, FX-

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By late November, the Allies decided to use Nebel to track down his French contacts, especially a Richard Martin, the former mayor of Margency, near Paris, who headed a staybehind organization codenamed JEANNE. In addition to Martin, the Allies sought several other French links to the Germans and hoped to re-establish contact with Nebel's SS associate in order to identify the locations of hidden ammunition dumps and radio operators in Paris.¹⁷ At this point, X-2 assigned Nebel the codename OSTRICH and transferred control of his third partner to the French. The Americans had not decided what to do with Maurice Zeller, the Frenchman captured with Nebel.¹⁸ (S)

Lt. Charles C. Michaelis, the X-2 case officer for the OSTRICH project, with the permission of Lord Rothschild, released Nebel from confinement and put him up in an apartment.¹⁹ Michaelis and the French took Nebel to various locations near Paris in order to identify individuals with whom he had been in contact before the Allied invasion. Lt. Michaelis translated the comments of Lt. Bardet, the French Securite Militaire officer

010-1116, (S); Victor [Rothschild] to Miss Teresa Clay, B.I.C., 20 November 1944, (S); in Nebel, [redacted], DO Records. (S)

¹⁷1st Lt. Charles C. Michaelis to Commanding Officer, X-2/Paris, "Nebel, Zeller, Vliegen Cases," 27 November 1944," (no classification listed), in Nebel, [redacted] DO Records. (S)

¹⁸1st Lt. Michaelis to Chief, SCI, "Nebell [sic], Zeller, Vliegen Case - Situation Report," 26 November 1944, (no classification listed); see Clipping, "SCI Weekly Report 22.11.44-29.11.44" for the X-2 codename both in Nebel, [redacted] DO Records. (S)

¹⁹Born in 1910 in New York, Charles C. Michaelis lived his childhood and early adult years in Paris. He was an avid sportsman, a journalist and photographer for various American news papers in Europe during the 1930s and into the first years of the German occupation of France. In 1941, Michaelis returned to the United States and was inducted into the US Army in February 1942. After enlisted service, he completed OCS and was commissioned in October 1943. Michaelis transferred to OSS in December 1943 and went to London shortly afterward to serve with X-2. Following the invasion of France, Michaelis went with X-2 into France where he specialized in locating and turning German agents. Michaelis returned to Paris where the Army discharged him in December 1945. Michaelis remained in the French capital as the manager of the *Palais des Sports*. [redacted]

[redacted] For further details, see Charles C. Michaelis, [redacted] DO Records. See also DO Records, [redacted], Box 33, [no folder listed], CIA ARC. (S)

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assigned to handle Nebel: "I believe that he is playing the game. [Nebel] is the prototype of the accomplished adventurer, with no scruples whatsoever, recognizing but one master, money, and one passion, women. As he is being kept happy," the X-2 officer recounted, "there is no reason why he should, in his present situation, cause us any trouble. Besides," Michaelis translated from the French report, "he is aware of the present critical situation of Germany, which should be a major reason for him to switch camps."²⁰ In a mid-December 1944 summary of Nebel's work with OSS, it was noted that the Allies controlled Nebel because his girlfriend and infant daughter lived in Mulhouse under Allied occupation.²¹ Likewise, the Americans retained a large sum of money that Nebel had with him at the time of his capture. X-2, in the meantime, arranged to get his gold watch and knife returned to him from the 307th CIC Detachment.²² (S)

We Have Confidence in Him (U)

With the opening of the German offensive in the Ardennes, Nebel's importance to Allied intelligence increased dramatically.²³ The need for the Americans and British to

²⁰Lt. Michaelis to Chief, SCI, "Report of Lt. Bardet, [French] Case Officer in OSTRICH Case," 6 December 1944, (no classification listed), in Nebel, , DO Records. (S)

²¹Untitled Summary of the OSTRICH Case, 12 December 1944, (S), in Nebel, DO Records. (S)

²²Extract, 12 December 1944, (S), in Nebel, , DO Records. (S)

²³Lt. Michaelis to Chief, SCI and Capt. [Francis C.] Grant, "Proposed Mission of Ostrich," 19 December 1944, [no classification listed], in Nebel, , DO Records. See also Lt. Col. Rothschild to "VBZ," 3 January 1945, enclosing notes on OSTRICH mission, [no classification listed], in Nebel, DO Records. (S)

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round up staybehind German agents in France mounted as the Allies learned that German special forces had landed behind their lines during the Battle of the Bulge.²⁴ The Americans, in particular, made a frenzied effort to track down disguised German troops who caused havoc—but little actual damage—behind the lines. In a plan devised by Otto Skorzeny and dubbed Operation GRIEF, a special unit of Germans who spoke varying degrees of English dressed in American uniforms and drove Allied vehicles. At the same time, German paratroopers, commanded by *Oberst* Friedrich A. Freiherr von der Heydte, parachuted into Belgium to create further panic. Soon, Allied troops all the way back to Paris were on the lookout for Germans dressed in US Army uniforms. On 28 December, Michaelis reported that Nebel had spent several days at the Cafe de la Paix trying to recognize German soldiers in American uniforms.²⁵ (S)

While Nebel spotted neither Otto Skorzeny nor any other German soldiers in Paris, he was key to the unraveling of three networks of German agents operating in France.²⁶ He enabled the Allies to capture Fernande Ney, the wife of the leader of the JEANNE sabotage network, who had returned to France and met with Nebel in Paris, at which time she was arrested by X-2.²⁷ Ney's information led X-2 to Charles Moreau,

²⁴Cable, X-2/Paris to X-2/London, 22 December 1944, (S), in Nebel, [] DO Records. (S)

²⁵Lt. Michaelis to Chief, SCI, "OSTRICH Situation Report," 28 December 1944, [no classification listed], in Nebel, [] DO Records. (S)

²⁶For a list of persons identified by Nebel, see X-2/Paris, "Personalities of RSHA Amt VI and the Lagardere Organization Under Control of SCI Paris," 17 January 1945, S-439, FPX-1901, (S), in Nebel, [] DO Records. Several of these German agents later became double agents for X-2. (S)

²⁷Extract, SCI Weekly Operations Report, 13-20 December 1944, [no classification listed], in Nebel, [] DO Records. For a notice seeking the arrest of Ney's husband, see X-

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another member of the group, and several other German support agents.²⁸ Further interrogations revealed that the Germans had dispatched three young French women from Germany via Switzerland to establish contact with Nebel.²⁹ The French also arrested Rene Poncin, a key contact of Nebel's in Paris and a member of the JEANNE network. Ironically, Poncin had enlisted in the French army after the liberation and was serving on the frontlines at the time of his apprehension.³⁰ Furthermore, Nebel identified another French agent of the Germans who had escaped to Switzerland. Armed with this information, X-2/Paris contacted its counterparts in Switzerland, which resulted in the agent's arrest by Swiss authorities.³¹ (S)

These arrests, coupled with Nebel's firsthand knowledge of the SD sabotage rings organized by *Hauptsturmfuhrer* Arno Besekow, a German SS officer and deputy to Otto Skorzeny, persuaded Lt. Michaelis and Col. Rothschild of Nebel's value, though not of his virtue.³² The French confirmed that Nebel's information had played a critical lead in

2/Paris, "Rene Desire Ney, Saboteur of RSHA, Amt VI/S," 13 January 1945, S-408, FPX-1902, (S), in Nebel, [] , DO Records. (S)

²⁸Cable, X-2/Paris to X-2/London, 28 December 1944, (S), in Nebel, [] , DO Records. (S)

²⁹Lt. Michaelis to Chief, SCI, "OSTRICH Situation Report," 22 December 1944, [no classification listed], in Nebel, [] DO Records. (S)

³⁰Lt. Michaelis to Chief, SCI, "Rene Poncin, SD Agent and Member of RICHARD Organization, Paris," 1 December 1944, [no classification listed]; and X-2/Paris, "Statement of Rene Poncin, Member of SD-Controlled 'JEANNE' Organization," 21 December 1944, S-288, FPX-1630, (S), in Nebel, [] DO Records. (S)

³¹X-2/London to X-2/Paris, "Our Letter on Marechal of Nebel Case dated 2.12.44," 19 December 1944, [no classification listed]; and X-2/Paris to X-2/London, "Marechal," 2 January 1945, (S), in Nebel, [] DO Records. See also X-2/Paris, "Marechal, German Agent," 27 January 1945, S-522, FPX-2026, (S), in Nebel, [] DO Records. (S)

³²See Lt. Michaelis to Chief, SCI, "Counter-Sabotage Measures vs. Amt VI (BESEKOW) Organization," 31 December 1944, [no classification listed], in Nebel, [] DO Records. For an additional report, see SAINT, Paris to SAINT, London and Washington, 29 January 1945, inclosing 1st Lt. Michaelis to Chief, SCI, "Resume of Known Activities of

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uncovering German caches.³³ "We have confidence in him," Michaelis declared. Nebel, who had been granted many liberties while in American hands, "is convinced that the German cause is lost and that he will play with us if only to avoid a worse fate which may await him in Germany." His cooperation with his captors was also a favorable mark, and OSS felt that Nebel's work on behalf of the Allies had not been exposed to the enemy. Michaelis reported that the "Germans consider him reliable, sure, and a valuable agent."³⁴ (S)

Despite the claims on Nebel's behalf, however, other X-2 officers expressed doubts. On 9 January 1945, Paul C. Blum, the X-2 chief in Bern, cabled X-2 in Paris and warned Allen Dulles, the OSS station chief, what he had learned from a senior Swiss police official. "Shoot him at sight; he's bad," the Swiss had exclaimed, adding that Nebel was "thoroughly Nazi and completely untrustworthy." Indeed, a Swiss court had sentenced Nebel to 15 years in prison in absentia for deserting the Swiss Army.³⁵ (S)

Officers at the Seventh Army still smarted over Nebel's removal by X-2/Paris and his transformation into an OSS penetration agent. Lt. Cdr. Quirk, the head of the Sixth

Besekow-Litt Organization in France," 25 January 1945, (S), in Nebel, [redacted], DO Records. An update to this report is found in X-2/Paris, "Besekow-Litt Organization in France," 20 February 1945, S-665, FPX-5023, (S), inclosing 1st Lt. Michaelis to Chief, SCI, "Resume of Known Activities of Besekow-Litt Organization in France (Addendum to Memorandum dated 26 January 1945)," [exact date in January 1945 obscured], in Nebel, [redacted], DO Records. (S)

³³X-2/Paris, "Report of Mission of Capitaine Klaiber, Chief of the 4e Section - 2e Bureau," 3 January 1945, S-373, FPX-1785, (S), in Nebel, [redacted], DO Records. (S)

³⁴Lt. Michaelis to Chief, SCI, "OSTRICH Situation Report," 28 December 1944, [no classification listed], in Nebel, [redacted], DO Records. (S)

³⁵DB-001 [Paul C. Blum] to X-2/Paris, "Ludwig Nebel," 9 January 1945, BX-33, (S); see also Cable, YAWL, Seventh Army, [identification undetermined], to X-2/Washington, X-2/Paris, 15 January 1945, (S), in Nebel, [redacted], DO Records. (S)

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Army Group's SCI Detachment, informed Col. Harrison, the G-2, on 22 December 1944 that Lt. Col. Burskin, chief of the Seventh Army's Counter Intelligence branch, and Maj. Alvie L. McDuff, commander of the Seventh Army's CIC detachment, had not acted in good faith regarding the handling and disposal of enemy agents. Quirk protested that both officers were trying to undermine Nebel's use by OSS. In fact, Quirk claimed that Burskin had even threatened to have Nebel shot if he came into the Seventh Army's lines. Faced with this reaction and the fact that the Seventh Army CIC had told the French about the OSS's employment of Nebel, Lt. Cdr. Quirk wanted to clarify whether the Seventh Army had any jurisdiction in a theater-level double-agent operation.³⁶ (U)

A Big Luncheon Party (U)

Swiss and Seventh Army concerns notwithstanding, X-2/Paris soon had big plans for Nebel.³⁷ By returning Nebel to German control, Michaelis and Lord Rothschild hoped that the Nazis would believe him and dispatch other agents to France where the Allies could easily round them up. They also tasked Nebel to obtain German sabotage target lists, identify Amt VI personnel involved in sabotage training, and locate enemy radio operators in France.³⁸ Nebel, in the meantime, prepared for his mission to return to

³⁶Lt. Cdr. Akeley P. Quirk to Col. Harrison, "CIB Coordination, Seventh Army," 22 December 1944, in RG 226, OSS Records, PARIS-X-2-OP-9, Entry 190B, Box 22, Folder 183, NARA. Apparently, the Seventh Army officers felt that they had been exposed to Nebel and his return to German lines jeopardized their safety. (U)

³⁷Extract of Cable, X-2/Paris to Lt. Cdr. Quirk, 2 January 1945, [no classification listed], in Nebel, ☐ DO Records. (S)

³⁸Unsigned note with no title, 12 January 1945, (S), in Nebel, ☐ DO Records. (S)

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German control and perfected his cover story. Lt. Michaelis even introduced Nebel to Herbert J.W. Berthold, another German intelligence turncoat and a successful X-2 penetration agent who was dressed in an American uniform.³⁹ Berthold formed an "excellent" impression of Nebel and his ability to recount a convincing story.⁴⁰ Michaelis even hosted a "big luncheon party" as a sendoff for Nebel on 5 January 1945; the guests included Lord Rothschild, French Lt. Bardet, and Berthold - a courtesy that defied proper counterintelligence procedures.⁴¹ (S)

X-2/Paris was taking a big gamble. If Nebel proved to be unreliable, he could expose the identities of his case officers and describe Berthold, the other German double agent recruited by the Allies. Nebel could also reveal that the Allies had virtually wrapped up the JEANNE network. Nevertheless, Rothschild and Michaelis felt that Nebel's knowledge of tactical importance was "minimal" and that the benefits of sending Nebel back into German hands outweighed the risks. "It is," the British nobleman concluded, "a matter of great urgency for OSTRICH to be passed through the lines."⁴² (S)

³⁹Berthold was a highly-successful X-2 penetration agent known as JIGGER. He had served in the Abwehr and provided the Allies with extensive information on German agent networks and personalities as well as the locations of numerous ammunition dumps hidden in France. Lord Rothschild, for example, noted on 26 September 1944 that "Lt. Michaelis is aware of the number of times I have been out with JIGGER and the fact that these dumps cannot be found without JIGGER." For further details on JIGGER, see *OSS War Report*, Vol. II, p. 251. Extensive documents on JIGGER, provided by him, are located in RG 226, OSS Records, Entry 190B, Boxes 19 and 20, PARIS-X-2-OP-3, and Entry 171, Box 47, WASH-X-2-PTS-15, NARA. (U)

⁴⁰Extract of a Journal Maintained by 1st Lt. Michaelis, 26 December 1944 entry, [no classification listed], in Nebel, ☐ DO Records. (S)

⁴¹Extract of a Journal Maintained by 1st Lt. Michaelis, 5 January 1945 entry, [no classification listed], in Nebel, ☐ DO Records. (S)

⁴²Unsigned note with no title, 12 January 1945, (S), in Nebel, ☐ DO Records.

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Deutsche Agent. Bitte Ich zum Ic (U)

On the night of 14-15 January 1945, Nebel crossed from the sector controlled by the 80th US Infantry Division into the German lines near Ettelbruck, Luxemburg.⁴³ Lt. Michaelis planned to maintain contact with Nebel through his father, who still lived in Switzerland. Nebel, while in Germany, would send his father a note indicating that he was well and had spent several weeks in Berlin. This would indicate that his project was going well and that he would be dispatched to France in the next few weeks. Actually obtaining this information from Nebel's father, however, soon posed a problem. Michaelis instead recommended that X-2 should instead take his brother, Joseph, into its confidence and tell him that Ludwig Nebel worked for the Allies. In exchange for the brother's help, the Allies would promise to help clear Nebel's name with the Swiss authorities after the war.⁴⁴ James R. Murphy, the head of X-2, who was in Paris at the time, approved of this approach and relayed the information to Paul C. Blum, the X-2 chief in Bern.⁴⁵ (S)

In the meantime, Allied officials began to wonder where Nebel was in Germany. Two German parachutists, captured near St. Quentin on 3 March 1945, claimed that

⁴³Extract of a Journal Maintained by Lt. Michaelis, 22 January 1945 entry, [no classification listed], in Nebel, [] DO Records. See also Maj. Andrew H. Berding, Chief, SCI, Twelfth Army Group to Chief, CIB, Twelfth Army Group, "Penetration Agents, Twelfth Army Group, to 23 January 1945," 23 January 1945, (S), in Nebel, [] DO Records. (S)

⁴⁴Lt. Michaelis to Chief, SCI, "Contacting OSTRICH's Father in Switzerland," 22 January 1945, [no classification listed], in Nebel, [] DO Records. (S)


⁴⁵JJ001[James R. Murphy] to DB001 [Paul C. Blum], "OSTRICH Operation (Part A & B)," 26 January 1945, [no classification listed], in Nebel, [] DO Records. The records do not indicate that OSS ever established contact with Nebel through his family in Switzerland. (S)


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Nebel, known as LEO, had been well received upon his return to German control in January. The two agents reported that the SD had promoted Nebel and that Hitler himself had rewarded him for his service in France.⁴⁶ In addition, Michaelis, now at the front with the SCI detachment of the Sixth Army Group, reported to X-2 in Paris that another captured German agent had told the French that Nebel was last seen in Wiesbaden in mid-March. Michaelis was still hopeful, however, saying that he expected Nebel to remain with his German unit and turn the entire group over to the Allies.⁴⁷ (S)

Michaelis soon heard Nebel's saga upon his return to Paris. Nebel had entered the German lines and encountered the first picket post where he told the guards, "*Deutsche agent. Bitte zum Ic,*" – "German agent. Please send me to the Ic, or intelligence officer." Nebel was directed to the division headquarters and waited there while his story was checked out in Berlin. He eventually made his way back to Friedenthal, the headquarters for RSHA Amt VI/S. Otto Skorzeny warmly welcomed Nebel and informed SS headquarters of his safe return. The SS directed Nebel to go to Berlin to meet with Hitler to tell him about an abortive plot to kill French leader Charles De Gaulle. On 30 January, Hitler promoted Nebel to SS *Obersturmfuhrer* and awarded him the Iron Cross, First and Second Class.⁴⁸ (S)

⁴⁶Capt. [John S.] Wood, [Jr.] to Maj. Holcomb, 15 March 1945, [no classification listed]; and Incoming Telegram, War Room, 15 March 1945, PF/601265, [no classification listed], in Nebel,  DO Records. (S)

⁴⁷Cable, Lt. Michaelis to X-2/Paris, 19 April 1945, 136, [no classification listed]; Cable, Maj. Berding to Lt. Cdr. Quirk, 5 May 1945, 16, [no classification listed]; X-2/Paris, "Preliminary Interrogation of Alice Mackert @ Antoinette Linser," 11 May 1945, S-1704, FPX-7001, (S), all in Nebel,  DO Records. (S)

⁴⁸Nebel's adventures in Germany are found in X-2/Paris, "Information Received from OSTRICH," 27 April 1945, S-1194, FPX-6367, (S); X-2/Paris, OSTRICH Case – Supplementary

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While in Berlin, Nebel discussed his plans to return to France to organize further resistance efforts. Nebel wanted to dispatch equipment to France, where another man, Jacques Doriot, would use it to foment an uprising among the French against the Allies. The death of Doriot a few days later in a bombing raid ended this portion of the German plans, but Nebel proceeded to the front to prepare for his return to France. While at Badenweiler in southern Germany at the headquarters of the XVIII SS Corps, Nebel learned from *Oberleutnant* Kurt Merck, a former Abwehr officer stationed in France, that an agent named Alois Tonin had betrayed him. Tonin, it turned out, had escorted Nebel across the lines in October 1944 and had been captured by the French in Strasburg. He had been doubled and sent back to Germany, but reported to the Germans directly that he had learned from French officers that Nebel had been captured and severely interrogated until he agreed to work for the Allies.⁴⁹ (S)

Nebel now found himself suspected by the Germans, but his friends, including Skorzeny and Besekow, refused to believe Tonin's accusations. As the Allies pushed into Germany, Nebel could not undertake his mission to France and he, along with other

Information," 30 April 1945, S-1668, FPX-6398, (S); X-2/Paris, "Interrogation of OSTRICH," 7 May 1945, [S number and FPX number illegible], (S); in Nebel, [redacted] [redacted], DO Records. (S)

⁴⁹Ibid. Interestingly, Merck appears later as an important figure in the Klaus Barbie case. Beyond his link to Nebel as mentioned above, Merck, alias Captain Kaiser, commanded a German army unit, known as Kommando ADLER, to conduct reconnaissance and intelligence work behind the enemy's lines. In the last weeks of the war, X-2 expressed interest in Merck's activities and those of his former driver in France, *Obergrefreiter* Johnny Plum, and Merck's French mistress, a Fraulein Richter. For further details on this side aspect of the Nebel case, see SCI Detachment, Sixth Army Group, "Fraulein Richter, Mistress of Merck Alias Capt. Kaiser," 17 May 1945, S-949, (S), and SCI Heidelberg, "Obergrefreiter Johnny Plum," 21 May 1945, S-1579, [no classification listed], in Nebel, [redacted] [redacted], DO Records. Merck's own postwar intelligence activities are found in Kurt Josef Merk [note his name has various spellings], [redacted] [redacted], DO Records. (S)

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elements of the SS in the Black Forest, sought shelter. On 22 April, Nebel (and two other SD members) surrendered to the French army who transferred him to Paris.⁵⁰ (S)

A Criminal Thug and Wholehearted Nazi (U)

After V-E Day, Michaelis brought Nebel and Berthold with him to the headquarters of the Sixth Army Group's SCI detachment in Heidelberg.⁵¹ By June, X-2 had transferred control of the two men from the Sixth Army Group to the SCI detachment of the Twelfth Army Group in Munich to "discover personalities of interest to us in our general operations."⁵² The following week, Capt. Eric W. Timm, commander of the SCI detachment in Munich, reported that he had arranged for both Nebel and Berthold to be employed by a firm to recover damaged vehicles.⁵³ Under this cover, both men could travel throughout Bavaria transporting goods and, at the same time, collect information

⁵⁰Ibid. (S)

⁵¹Sixth Army Group SCI Detachment, "Weekly Activity Report 13 May 1945 to 20 May 1945," 20 May 1945, in RG 226, OSS Records, Entry 190B, PARIS-X-2-OP-9, Box 22, Folder 183, NARA. (U)

⁵²Twelfth Army Group SCI Detachment, "Activity Report for Week Ending 9 June 1945," 10 June 1945, LWX-4, enclosing Twelfth Army Group SCI Detachment to Assistant Chiefs of Staff, G-2, Third Army, Seventh Army, and Commanding Officer, SCI Detachment, Twelfth Army Group, "Activity Report for Week Ending 9 June 1945," 10 June 1945, in RG 226, OSS Records, Entry 108A, WASH-REG-INT-163, Box 287, [no folder listed], NARA. (U)

⁵³Eric W. Timm, born in 1914, joined OSS in 1944 after having worked for several years as the FBI's chief of the sabotage section. He entered the Army in August 1944 with a direct commission as a first lieutenant. Following assignments in Washington and London, Timm became the liaison officer for the Third Army SCI Detachment in the spring of 1945. He returned to the United States in late 1945 and received his discharge from military service in early 1946.

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for Capt. Michaelis, who had been posted with X-2 in Munich.⁵⁴ OSS hoped eventually to use both men in intelligence operations.⁵⁵ Timm and Michaelis kept Nebel and Berthold busy with small assignments that summer.⁵⁶ As it turned out however, X-2 was unsuccessful in placing Nebel in the trucking business, and he continued to live with Berthold in Munich in September.⁵⁷ X-2 noted disappointingly that "great difficulties have been experienced in establishing JIGGER and OSTRICH under adequate business cover, and their intelligence activities have as a result been necessarily circumscribed."⁵⁸ With the departure of Capt. Michaelis from Munich in late October 1945 and directives from Washington to reduce the overall number of assets, both Nebel and Berthold were dropped. Capt. Timm determined that the two men required "too much attention, [and]

⁵⁴Twelfth Army Group SCI Detachment to Assistant Chiefs of Staff, G-2, Third Army, Seventh Army, and Commanding Officer, SCI Detachment, Twelfth Army Group, "Activity Report for Week Ending 16 June 1945," 18 June 1945, LMX-010-618, (S) and Capt. Michaelis to Commanding Officer, X-2/Germany, "Situation Report on Prospective Penetration Agents," 29 June 1945, LMX-002-629, (S), both in DO Records, , Box 3, Folder 21, CIA ARC. See also Lt. Edward R. Weismiller, Chief of Operations, X-2/Germany, to Chief, X-2/Germany, "Report of Agent Penetration Cases," 2 July 1945, LWX-002-702, (S), in DO Records, , Box 406, [no folder listed], CIA ARC. (S)

⁵⁵Lt. Weismiller to SAINT, Washington, "Semi-Monthly Operation Report, SCI Munich," 3 August 1945, LWX-62, enclosing Capt. Timm to Commanding Officer, X-2/Germany, and G-2, CIB, Third Army, "Semi-Monthly Operation Report, SCI Munich," 1 August 1945, in RG 226, OSS Records, Entry 108A, WASH-REG-INT-163, Box 287, [no folder listed], NARA. (U)

⁵⁶Lt. Weismiller to SAINT, Washington, "Semi-Monthly Operation Report, SCI Munich," 22 August 1945, LMX-010-815, (S), enclosing Capt. Timm to Commanding Officer, X-2/Germany and G-2, CIB, Third Army, "Semi-Monthly Operation Report SCI Munich," 15 August 1945, in DO Records, , Box 3, Folder 21, CIA ARC. (S)

⁵⁷Capt. Timm to Commanding Officer, X-2/Germany and G-2, CIB, Third Army, "Semi-Monthly Operations Report, SCI Munich," 30 September 1945, G-TSX-3747, (S), in DO Records, Box 3, Folder 21, CIA ARC. (S)

⁵⁸X-2/Germany, "Progress Report on X-2 Penetration Cases Run in the American Occupation Zone in Germany, September 1945," 1 October 1945, LWX-010-1001, (S), in DO Records, , Box 1, Folder 14, CIA ARC. (S)

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service, and demand [ed] substantial payment for information which can be obtained from more stable sources."⁵⁹ (U)

American intelligence perhaps thought that this would be the last that it heard from Nebel. In fact, X-2 soon learned the extent to which Nebel had concealed his past from the Allies. In March 1946, Lt. Sidney H. Lenington, the deputy chief of X-2 in Germany, assigned Flight Officer Sherman D. Lamb to examine a Danish request for the extradition of an X-2 agent named Koehler for war crimes committed in Denmark.⁶⁰

Lenington provided Lamb with the following details:

⁵⁹Lt. Sidney H. Lenington, Deputy Chief, X-2/Germany, to SAINT, Washington, "Semi-Monthly Reports, SCI/Munich," 12 December 1945, LMX-005-1130, enclosing Capt. Timm to Commanding Officer, X-2/Germany and G-2, CIB, Third Army, "Semi-Monthly Operations Report SCI Munich," 31 October 1945, in RG 226, OSS Records, Entry 108A, WASH-REG-INT-163, Box 275, [no folder listed], NARA. (U)

⁶⁰Sidney H. Lenington, born in 1912 to American missionaries in Brazil, entered the US Army as a private in 1943. He transferred to the OSS in early 1944 and served in Italy, France, and Germany where he received a direct commission as a second lieutenant in June 1945. Lenington remained overseas and became chief of X-2 in Germany in January 1946. Upon his discharge from the Army in mid-1946, Crosby Lewis, the chief of the German Mission, noted that "Lieutenant Lenington has had almost insuperable obstacles facing him in merely keeping the Headquarters office of X-2 Branch functioning. Despite no personnel and no assistance or direction from Washington, however, he has managed to carry out the operations of the Branch, ensuring the security of SI operations, and maintaining throughout an intelligence, imaginative, and cheerful attitude." □

□ Sherman D. Lamb, born in Utah in 1924, joined the Army Air Force in 1943. After serving as a bomber pilot in Europe, Lamb joined the OSS as a pilot and air operations officer in the summer of 1945. By early 1946, Lamb was a liaison officer with the Strategic Services Unit in Germany. He left government service in mid-1947 to return to college. □

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Koehler was an early recruit by this organization and performed a series of missions behind German lines in addition to other missions carrying him well into the German Zone which proved of great usefulness to the Allied Command in the building up of the OB [Order of Battle] of the German army and the accumulation of general information on members of the German Intelligence Service.

The information given by Koehler has subsequently proved entirely reliable, and the organization feels itself obligated to protect and aid him as much as possible in setting him up on a normal basis of living. For this reason we are very anxious to determine whether the charges made by the Danish Mission are substantiated by sufficient evidence so that any element of doubt as to Koehler's guilt is removed. At the time he was recruited there were rumors to the effect that he had been mixed up with some unsavory deal in Denmark, but the charges were never substantiated and we would be very loath to allow him to be transferred to Denmark to stand trial for some denunciation which had no basis of actual fact.⁶¹ (U)

Lenington, however, emphasized that Lamb should verify the evidence collected by the investigators in Nuremberg and, "if Koehler is actually guilty, then we will not stand in the way of his being transferred to Denmark for trial." Lamb met with the Danish investigator and reported that the case "rests on evidence sufficiently convincing as to assure a death sentence."⁶² (U)

In June, SSU's Bern Station transmitted a request for information on Nebel from the Swiss Federal Police. The German Mission responded with the news that Nebel had been arrested and would shortly be turned over to the Danish Government. "When War Crimes approached us initially on the matter of his extradition to Denmark," Lt. Sidney H. Lenington the deputy chief of X-2 in Germany wrote, "we felt ourselves obligated to

⁶¹Lt. Lenington to Flight Officer Sherman D. Lamb, "Individual Wanted by International Military Tribunal," 12 March 1946, LWX-75, in RG 226, OSS Records, Entry 108A, WASH-REG-INT-163, Box 287, [no folder listed], NARA. (U)

⁶²Ibid. (U)

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give him as much protection as possible due to the work performed by him while under our control. Since that time, however, the Danish Government has become increasingly insistent and has produced evidence which has made it impossible for us to block the extradition."⁶³ (S)

The Nebel case continued to distract American intelligence for the next two years, although there is no indication in existing records that the Strategic Services Unit, the Central Intelligence Group, or the Central Intelligence Agency ever reviewed the case to determine how Nebel had deceived the Allies as to his wartime background and hid his activities in Denmark. (S)

In January 1947, Brigadier C.D. Roberts of MI 6 approached Lt. Cdr. Winston M. Scott, CIG's representative in London, about Nebel's situation. Roberts informed Scott that the Danes now held Nebel for crimes that he had committed in Denmark while with RSHA Amt VI. "Although this man was undoubtedly a criminal thug and a wholehearted Nazi," Roberts admitted, "the fact remains that he gave us a considerable amount of information on the S.D. and worked loyally for the Allies at considerable danger to himself." The British proposed that the two Allies make a "discreet approach" to the Danes to inform them of the role that Nebel had played during the latter part of the war. Roberts declared, "We would make it clear that we have no wish to interfere with the course of Danish justice in dealing with crimes against the Danes in Danish territory at a time when Nebel was an out-and-out Amt VI man, as any charges of this nature

⁶³SAINT, AMZON to SAINT, Bern, "Ludwig Nebel," 29 June 1946, LWX-528, (S), in DO Records, [] , Box 1, Folder 9, CIA ARC. (S)

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would no doubt be considered by them to be exclusively of a domestic Danish nature, but we would ask them to take into consideration his later good efforts on our behalf.”⁶⁴ (S)

Scott sent an urgent cable to Washington outlining Nebel's situation and the British proposal.⁶⁵ Washington, in turn, informed the CIG representative in Copenhagen that it supported the British steps. “Maximum purpose of intercession,” the Washington cable stated, “is saving his life, not reduction of sentence non-capital.”⁶⁶ Scott then told Brig. Roberts on 3 February 1947 that “our Washington office is in complete agreement with your policy of intercession with Danish authorities in Nebel's behalf and has instructed our representative in Copenhagen to act accordingly.”⁶⁷ (S)

Allied intercession soon became a sticky issue because the British and Americans in Copenhagen both reported that any “representation about Nebel would be resented by the Danish authorities.” Nebel had been “loaned” to the Danes by the US Army in Germany to aid in their war crimes investigations, and thus the MI 6 and CIG representatives in Denmark argued that authorities in the American sector should make any queries about Nebel's fate.⁶⁸ The Danes were holding Nebel as the leader of the

⁶⁴C.D. Roberts to Lt. Cdr. Winston M. Scott, “Ludwig Nebel @Leo Neumann @OSTRICH,” 28 January 1947, 183, (S), in Nebel, [redacted], DO Records. (S)

⁶⁵Cable, [redacted] to Special Operations, 29 January 1947, [redacted] 1347, IN 47794, (S), in Nebel, [redacted], DO Records. (S)

⁶⁶Cable, Washington to [redacted], 30 January 1947, Washington 5896, [no OUT number listed], (S), in Nebel, [redacted], DO Records. (S)

⁶⁷Lt. Cdr. Scott to Brig. Roberts, “Ludwig Nebel @ OSTRICH,” 3 February 1947, (S), in Nebel, [redacted], DO Records. (S)

⁶⁸Cable, [redacted] to Washington, 7 February 1947, [redacted] 160, [no IN number listed], (S); note to [redacted], M.I.-5, 10 February 1947, in Nebel, [redacted], DO Records. In a subsequent message, Headquarters concurred with [redacted] recommendations that no action be taken in Denmark. See Cable, Washington to [redacted] 11 February 1947, Washington 6145, [no OUT number listed], (S), in Nebel, [redacted], DO Records. (S)

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German gang that had murdered Danish poet and religious leader Kaj Munk in 1944. Munk had died in the "clearing murders"—inspired by Heinrich Himmler and approved by Hitler—when the SS assassinated well-known Danes as well as many commoners in revenge for acts of resistance to the German occupation.⁶⁹ (S)

Nebel's case came up again in April 1947 when the German Mission cabled Washington to request an update. For the first time, American intelligence linked Nebel with Leo Kohler, the name of the man charged by the Danes. The German Mission specifically asked the Danish Mission to provide the latest information on the case.⁷⁰ Not until early January 1949 did [redacted], the [redacted] [redacted] provide additional information about Nebel. [redacted] obtained letters from Nebel's Danish defense attorney to the British Legation in 1948, asking for British assistance in locating several American and British officers, including Capt. Michaelis, Capt. Timm, and Col. Rothschild, to verify that Nebel had been employed by the Allied "Secret Service." As of early 1949, the British had not answered the request.⁷¹ According to [redacted]

[redacted] "Kaj Munk, of whose murder [Nebel] is accused, has become a national

⁶⁹For further details on the Danish "clearing murders," see Whitney R. Harris, *Tyranny on Trial: The Trial of the Major German War Criminals at the End of World War II at Nuremberg, Germany, 1945-1946* (Dallas: Southern Methodist University Press, 1954, rev. ed. 1999), pp. 216-219. For a discussion of the war in Denmark, see Richard Petrow, *The Bitter Years: The Invasion and Occupation of Denmark and Norway April 1940-May 1945* (New York: William Murrow & Company, 1974). (U)

⁷⁰Cable, Heidelberg to Washington, 11 April 1947, Heidelberg 399, IN 12293, (S), in Nebel, [redacted] [redacted], DO Records. (S)

⁷¹[redacted] [redacted] to Chief, Foreign Branch W, "Louis Nebel," 7 January 1949, WDC-A-164, (S), enclosing [redacted] [redacted] to the Legation of the British Empire, 3 April 1948 and 17 November 1948, in Nebel [redacted] [redacted] DO Records. For further information on early US intelligence [redacted]

[redacted]

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martyr-hero. Emotion is connected with the very mention of his name. To take any stand on this matter for the defense of [Nebel] would in no way change the outcome of the [Nebel's] trial and would involve this organization's predecessor as well as the United States Government in rather unfavorable publicity." As a result, [] stated that he planned to take no action in regard to Nebel unless otherwise directed by Washington.⁷²

(S)

The Danish Government sentenced Nebel to 12 years imprisonment with the right to appeal. OSS and its successors had not been "implicated" in the trial. Consequently, the [] in Washington wrote [] on 4 February 1949 to say that the Nebel case was closed as far as the CIA was concerned. "From available records it has been determined that, while subject was turned over to the Danes to stand trial for war crimes committed during the German occupation, he was given as much protection as possible because of his work while under the control of our predecessor organization." [] noted that the Central Intelligence Group in 1947 had considered interceding on Nebel's behalf to save his life, but later decided that such a move was inadvisable. "This viewpoint," noted [] "has not changed in the past two years." Nebel's light sentence further persuaded CIA to take no action in his case.⁷³

Nebel, whose name in German means "fog," appears to have masked his wartime actions until his past finally caught up with him. (S)

⁷²Ibid. (S)

⁷³Chief, FBW, to [] "Louis Nebel," 4 February 1949, WDC-W-336, (S), in Nebel, [] , DO Records. (S)